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ARTICLE 4 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY†
Sherrod Lewis Bumgardner*
Article 4
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of
them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any
of the Parties is threatened.1

INTRODUCTION
Article 4 is a statement of action. Mandatory consultation by the Parties
together occurs when any Party believes the territorial integrity, political
independence, or security of any of the Parties is threatened. The Parties
confirmed the reach of Article 4 through a written interpretive minute of the text
of the North Atlantic Treaty at the conclusion of the top-secret negotiations that
created the North Atlantic Alliance. “Article 4 is applicable in the event of a
threat in any part of the world, to the security of any of the Parties, including a
threat to the security of their overseas territories.”2 While not included in the
interpretive minute, very early in the negotiations the Parties recognized the
power of consultation and agreed to use it to address undefined threats such as
“indirect aggression.”3
One 21st Century view is that Article 4 enshrines territorial integrity,
political independence, or security as “NATO’s original threat perception.”4 But

†
This Article contains views provided in the author’s personal capacity and may not reflect agreed upon
policy or views of NATO Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation or the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization.
*
Allied Command Transformation, Staff Element Europe.
1
North Atlantic Treaty art. 4, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. The United States is the
depository for the North Atlantic Treaty, see NATO Status Lists, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (June 18, 2019),
https://www.state.gov/nato-status-lists/ (providing the North Atlantic Treaty at the United States depository).
2
Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, March 15, 1949
in F OREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U NITED S TATES , 1949, W ESTERN E UROPE , IV, O FFICE OF THE H ISTORIAN
(1949).
3
See id.; Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the United States—United Kingdom—Canada Security Conversations, Held at Washington, March 31, 1948 in F OREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED S TATES , 1949,
W ESTERN E UROPE , III, O FFICE OF THE H ISTORIAN (1948). See also T IMOTHY ANDREWS S AYLE ,
ENDURING A LLIANCE : A H ISTORY OF NATO AND T HE P OSTWAR G LOBAL ORDER , 16 (2019) (“In the
early security conversations American, British and Canadian diplomates had considered how to meet
what they knew to be the real threat—what Kennan called ‘political conquest’ and what others called
‘indirect aggression.’”).
4
ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, COLLECTIVE SECURITY, 185 (2011).
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this view overlooks Article 4 as a means, through consultation, to collectively
consider threats that were something other than an armed attack.
To explain this broader view of the role of Article 4 during the seventy-year
history of the North Atlantic Alliance, this essay has three aims. First, to use
now available declassified online records of the negotiation of Article 4 and the
North Atlantic Treaty to show how the Parties drafted Article 4 to ensure their
response to the threat of aggression, short of an armed attack, remained
consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Second, to summarize the role
Article 4 has played in the process of consultation of Parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Third, and
finally, to highlight how the Parties through subsequent agreement have relied
upon Article 4 in NATO’s Strategic Concept, the high-level policy guiding
NATO’s evolution, to undertake new tasks.5

I.

DRAFTING ARTICLE 4

As Lawrence S. Kaplan has described, by 1948 the United Nations Security
Council could not fulfill its decision-making responsibilities about threats to
peace, breaches of the peace, and actions of aggression as required by Article 39
of the U.N. Charter.6 To address this reality, in December 1948 the British
Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, encouraged by France, proposed to the United
States Secretary of State, George Marshall, a system of Western defense that
also protected overseas territories.7 The United States responded by hosting on
March 22, 1948 in a clandestine corner of the Pentagon, the United States-United
Kingdom-Canada Security Conversations on alternative international security
arrangements.8
During the six meetings, “the most secret ever held in Washington,”9 the
British sought “a firm commitment on the part of the US to aid militarily in the

5
See generally Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of
the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO SUMMIT (Nov. 19–20, 2010), https://www.nato.
int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf.
6
See Lewis Kaplan, Origins of NATO: 1948–1949 Overview, 34 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 11–28 (2019)
(article can be found earlier in this issue); Why the Treaty Was Signed, in THE NATO HANDBOOK (1952); U.N.
Charter art. 39.
7
Telegram from the Chargé in London (Gallman) to the Secretary of State, Foreign Relations of the U.
S., Document 1,840.00/12-2247 (Dec. 22, 1947), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v03/d1.
8
ESCOTT REID, TIME OF FEAR AND HOPE, 71 (1977); Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, The Pentagon Negotiations March 1948: The Launching of the North Atlantic Treaty, 59 INT’L AFF. 351, 356 (1983).
9
ROLAND PHILIPPS, A SPY NAMED ORPHAN: THE ENIGMA OF DONALD MACLEAN, 201 (2018).
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event of any aggression in Europe.”10 This request matched the strategic thinking
of both the U.S. and Canada. Since early 1948 the United States had been
considering a new collective defense arrangement.11 Independently Canada was
exploring a response to the threat of attack or aggression not subject to Security
Council veto.12 The outcome of the tri-nation meeting was agreement by the
United States to pursue formation of a North Atlantic regional security
arrangement as a U.S. led initiative. 13 A U.S. position paper was drafted
explaining proposed next steps and Western European nations to be invited to a
larger discussion of this new defense arrangement.14 Based upon a shared
understanding by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada of what a
new treaty would require, the position paper also proposed eight provisions for
the defense agreement.15 Paragraph 5. f. became the first version of what would
later become Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, identifying the concepts of
armed attack and indirect aggression as the two threats to territorial integrity and
political independence.16 It states that “Provision for consultation between all
the Parties in the event of any Party considering that its territorial integrity or
political independence is threatened by armed attack or indirect aggression in
any part of the world.”17
The Washington Security Talks18 began the negotiation of a North Atlantic
security pact on July 6, 1948 with twenty senior ambassadors and diplomats of
six nations present.19 After nineteen meetings, on September 9, 1948, they

10
Minutes of the First Meeting of the United States—United Kingdom—Canada Security Conversations,
Held at Washington, March 22, 1948 in F OREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U NITED S TATES , supra note 3.
11
SIDNEY SNYDER, FINGERPRINTS ON HISTORY, THE NATO MEMOIRS OF THEODORE C. ACHILLES, 14
(Lawrence S. Kaplan & Sidney R. Snyder eds. 1992).
12
Escott Reid, The Birth of the North Atlantic Alliance, 22 INT’L J. 426, 427 (1967).
13
See Minutes of the Third Meeting of the United States—United Kingdom—Canada Security Conversations, Held at Washington, March 24, 1948 in F OREIGN R ELATIONS OF THE U NITED S TATES , supra note 3.
14
See Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the United States—United Kingdom—Canada Security Conversations, Held at Washington, April 1, 1948 in F OREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U NITED S TATES , supra note 3.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
REID, supra note 8, at 47, Table 1: Intergovernmental Meetings. This meeting was the second stage of
the intergovernmental meetings held in Washington D.C. that produced the North Atlantic Treaty. The first stage
was Three Powers Meeting that occurred in the Pentagon between the United States, Great Britain, and Canada
from March 22–April 1, 1948. The second stage was the Six Powers Meeting between United States, Great
Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands from July 6–September 10, 1949. The third stage was
the Seven Powers Meetings that included Luxembourg from December 10–24, 1948. The fourth stage was the
Seven to Eight Powers Meetings from January 10–March 28, 1949 when Norway joined the discussions on
March 4, 1949. See id.
19
Minutes of the First Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, July 6, 1948, 11:30
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completed the Memorandum by the Participants in the Washington Security
Talks, July 6 to September 9, Submitted to Their Respective Governments for
Study and Comment.20
The Memorandum recommended “those nations having a primary interest in
the security of the North Atlantic area should collaborate in the development of
a regional or collective defence arrangement ... Such action should be taken
within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations.”21 It echoed
statements that George F. Kennan, who took part in the discussions, had made
in his 1946 Long Telegram and published in the 1947 article, The Sources of
Soviet Conduct.22 “The U.S.S.R. under Kremlin dictatorship, utilizing the
technique of indirect aggression and the threat of direct aggression, is an
implacable enemy of western civilization and the present situation in Europe
must be regarded as extremely insecure.”23
The Memorandum offered an “Outline of Provision Which Might be Suitable
for Inclusion in a North Atlantic Security Pact.”24 This version broadened Article
4. Specific citations to the Rio and Brussels treaties were included so national
governments could check the references the drafters drew from:
Provision for consultation (a) in the event of a threat to the integrity of
the territory or the sovereignty or the political independence of a Party,
(b) in the event of an armed attack against a Party outside the area
delineated in article 7, (c) if the security of any Party should be affected
by an armed attack against a nation not a party to the Treaty, or (d) in

a.m. in F OREIGN R ELATIONS OF THE U NITED S TATES , supra note 3.
20
See generally Memorandum by the Participants in the Washington Security Talks, July 6 to September
9, Submitted to Their Respective Governments for Study and Comment in F OREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED S TATES , supra note 3.
21
Id.
22
See generally Telegram from the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Soviet Union Telegram, Document 475, 861.00/2-224.6 (Feb. 22, 1946),
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v06/d475; George F. Kennan, The Source of Soviet Conduct, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 566, 581–82 (1947). George F. Kennan served as the Director of Policy Planning in the
United States State Department from 1947 to 1948 and participated in the Washington Security Talks. See
George Frost Kennan, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/kennangeorge-frost.
23
See generally Memorandum by the Participants in the Washington Security Talks, supra note 20.
24
Id.
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the event of any other fact or situation which might constitute a threat
to the peace. (Rio, Art. 6; Brussels, Art. VII, Par. 2).25

Noticeably absent was the phrase, indirect aggression in any part of the
world, proposed in the April 1948 draft.26 This deletion sustained the comment
made in the minutes of the United States-United Kingdom-Canada meetings.
“Abandon any attempt to define ‘indirect aggression’ substituting therefore
provisions for consultation in the event any party to the pact considers itself thus
menaced.”27 This comment captured the United States and British view that,
“indirect aggression could not and should not be defined, as this might suggest
that the signatory powers were attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of
other states.”28
The Washington Exploratory Talks on Security reconvened in December
1948 following the November reelection of President Harry Truman.29 Three
meetings occurred. On December 13, after considering the September 9 version
of Article 4 proposed in the Memorandum, Canada observed:
The proposed treaty contemplated consultation between the parties in
the event of a threat to peace anywhere in the world. This would be a
matter more for Foreign Ministers or their representatives than for
Defense Ministers or Chiefs of Staff. There should therefore be, as the
senior agency under the treaty, some sort of council on a ministerial
level made up of Foreign Ministers or their deputed representatives.
This council would have the task of creating any other agencies
necessary to give effect to the treaty.30

This proposal to create a decision-making body within the Alliance was
woven into the 19-page report delivered on December 24, 1948. Annex A to this

25

Id.
See Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the United States—United Kingdom—Canada Security Conversations, supra note 3.
27
See id.
28
See REID, supra note 8, at 159.
29
See generally Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, December 13, 1948, 2:30 p.m. in F OREIGN R ELATIONS OF THE U NITED S TATES , supra note 3.
30
Id.
26
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report provided a new draft treaty and included an organizational article that
established a council.31 Shorter Article 4 now contained just two clauses:
Article 4 (Consultation)
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of
them,
(a) the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of
the Parties is threatened; or
(b) there exists any situation which constitutes a threat to or breach of
the peace.32

The Nations judged the shorter draft sufficient to cover “all threats to the
peace, including attacks against the overseas territories of any of the parties to
the Treaty.”33 The draft of Article 6 provided equivalent notice to the Security
Council when Article 4 consultation occurred or, following an armed attack,
Article 5 actions were taken. Article 6(2) provided, “Any fact or situation
constituting a threat to or breach of the peace and deemed to require consultation
under Article 4, or any armed attack requiring action under Article 5, shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council.”34
The nations accepted Article 4 as final on January 14, 1949.35 The text
permitted the Parties to consult together about threats to “territorial integrity,
political independence or security of any of the Parties.”36 The territorial scope
of matters subject to consultation was world-wide, including overseas
territories.37 The Parties also understood consultation could occur about threats

31
Report of the Int’l Working Group to the Ambassadors’ Committee, in F OREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED S TATES , supra note 3.
32
Id. Though not mentioned in the State Department minutes, the United States objected to paragraph (b)
in the December version as too broad and suggesting an organization that rivaled functions of the Security Council. Consequently paragraph (b) was removed on Jan. 14, 1949. See NICOLAS HENDERSON, THE BIRTH OF NATO,
78–79 (1983); see also John F. Hickman, North Atlantic Pact: The Drafting of the Treaty, PACT D-6/1, (Mar.
29, 1949)(This 81-page type-written and stapled document was prepared for the United States Secretary of State
Dean Acheson following the completion of the negotiations and provides all of the changes of the text of the
treaty from the first exploratory conversation in July 1948 through the final text released on 18 March 1949.It
was declassified by the United States Mission to NATO and provided to the NATO Archives for public release.)
(Copy in possession of the author.).
33
Id.
34
Id. This provision was deleted from the text of Article 6 on Mar. 5, 1949. See Hickman, supra note 32
at Tab G, 2.
35
See Hickman supra note 32, at 13.
36
North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1.
37
Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, supra note 2.
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not amounting to an armed attack such as indirect aggression38 or aggression by
subversive action.39
While these understandings provide some scope to the consultations Article
4 offers, much is left unstated about the workings of these consultations. What
kind of threat is valid? What level of threat to the core interests listed in Article
4 may cause a Party to call for consultation?
At the March 4, 1949 meeting, the newly arrived Norwegian Ambassador,
Mr. Morgenstierne, asked, “whether consultation between members had to be
limited to instances where one of the parties felt threatened. Could it not also
take place in connection with political matters?”40 Could Article 4 be interpreted
to include consultation on other matters?41
The Ambassadors who had been negotiating the Treaty since July 1948
replied that a call for Article 4 consultation was a call to consider aggression
against a Party by subversive action.42 Permissive political consultation could
be brought before the North Atlantic Council if it “had a bearing on the execution
of the Treaty.”43
While this distinction narrowed Article 4 consultation, it confirmed the
broad range of subjects requiring political consultation by the North Atlantic
Council.44 Left unsaid was how the process of consultation—whether mandatory

38
Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the United States—United Kingdom—Canada Security Conversations
supra note 3. This understanding was first stated in the minutes of the March 31, 1948 United States—United
Kingdom—Canada Security Conversation. Id. ¶ b. On March 15, 1948 the United States representative, Mr.
Hickerson, who was likely the author of the March 31, 1948 comment, stated “Direct aggression was dealt with
in Articles 3 and 5, and indirect aggression was left for Article 4, on consultation.” Minutes of the Eighteenth
Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, supra note 2.
39
This understanding was stated on March 4, 1949 in response to a question by the Norwegian Ambassador about Article 4. The Dutch Ambassador “Mr. Van Kleffens wondered whether the Norwegian Ambassador
should be informed that the is Article [4], through the word ‘security,’ covered also aggression by subversive
action. See Minutes of the Fifteenth Meeting of Washington Exploratory Talks on Security in F OREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED S TATES , supra note 2.
40
Id.
41
Id. (“Article 4 would not be interpreted as to exclude consultation on other matters than those specifically mentioned.”).
42
Id.
43
See REID, supra at 8, 164–65. (stating the view of Ambassador Wrong of Canada.)
44
See The Evolution of NATO Political Consultation, NATO ARCHIVES, https://www.nato.int/archives/docu/d630502e.htm (“[T]he principle of continuing political consultation between the Alliance partners
is clearly implied by the Preamble and Articles 2, 3, 4 and 9 of the Treaty; the principle that NATO political
consultation is not necessarily confined to the area defined in 1949 follows from the Treaty which mentions no
such geographical limits to. Article 6 refers to the commitments mentioned in Article 5 not to Article 4 or other
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or permissive—would result in decisions or actions. This silence exists because
the North Atlantic Treaty contains no obligation for a Party or the Parties to take
action following Article 4 consultation.45
The United States made the North Atlantic Treaty public on March 18,
1949.46 At the April 4, 1949 signing ceremony, President Truman emphasized
the centrality of Article 4 consultation to the purpose of the Treaty in his address:
This treaty is a simple document. The nations which sign it agree to
abide by the peaceful principles of the United Nations, to maintain
friendly relations and economic cooperation with one another, to
consult together whenever the territory or independence of any one
of them is threatened, and to come to the aid of any one of them which
may be attacked.47

II. ARTICLE 4 IN PRACTICE 1949–2019
A. Consultation
The first meeting of the North Atlantic Council occurred on September 17,
1949 in Washington, D.C.48 The Council stated its purpose was to assist the
Parties, “in accordance with the Charter, in achieving the primary purpose of the
United Nations—the maintenance of international peace and security.”49 It then
declared the North Atlantic Treaty constitutes the Council’s Terms of Reference
and described the location of Council Sessions, Chairmanship, Languages,
methods of Permanent Coordination, and created subsidiary bodies.50
Invocations of either Article 4 or Article 5 would cause extraordinary Council
meetings.51
Like the silence in the Treaty concerning decision-making following Article
4 consultation, the Council at their first meeting issued no formal procedures for
relevant articles.”).
45
Richard H. Heindel et al., The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate, 43 AM. J. INT’L L.
633, 652 (1949). See also RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION, 2d, 165 (2015)(“Sometimes the absence of something means simply that it is not there.”).
46
See F OREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U NITED S TATES , supra note 2, Editorial Note.
47
Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, Address
at the Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C. (April 4, 1949).
48
North Atlantic Council: Communique, 44 AM. J. INT’L L. 22 (1950).
49
Id.
50
Id. at 23–27.
51
Thorsten V. Kalijarvi and Francis O. Wilcox, The Organizational Framework of the North Atlantic
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decision-making and never has.52 The Alliance, since 1952, continues to rely on
the process of consultation to reach decisions by consensus as occurred when
the Parties drafted the North Atlantic Treaty.53 As observed after the first
Council meeting, “The responsibility for making final decisions . . . lies with the
respective governments rather than with the Council itself.”54 What has
remained important for the past seventy years is the process of consultation for
the Allies, as sovereign states, to reach a collective decision whether or not they
are using the—albeit limited—Article 4 process of consultation.55
In the 20th Century, no member of the Alliance called for Article 4
consultation. However, in 1951, carrying on the question raised by Norway in
the last days of the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 4 became a
useful early reference for distinguishing emergency consultations from political
consultations.56
The Committee considered the phrase “frequent consultation” in the
terms of reference of the Committee to have the general meaning of
exchanges of views on policy matters with a view to possible
coordinated action, rather than the technical meaning of the word
‘‘consultation” as used in Article IV of the Treaty where it clearly
refers to situations of emergency.57

In 1954, the first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay, emphasized
Article 4 consultation as a deterrence measure before an armed attack:
The mutual guarantees provided by Articles 3 and 5 are strengthened
by Article 4, under which the Parties undertake to consult whenever
one of them considers that there is a threat to the territorial integrity,
political independence or security of any of them. This Article
provides for consultation before an armed attack has taken place. It

Treaty, 44 AM. J. INT’L L. 155, 157 (1950)
52
Id.
53
Founding Treaty, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/topics_67656.htm?selectedLocale=en (“In addition to collective defence and key values, the principle of
consensus decision-making and the importance of consultation define the spirit of the Organization, together
with its defensive nature and its flexibility.”).
54
Thorsten Kalijarvi and Francis Wilcox, supra note 56, at 157.
55
16 NATO LETTER 5, January 1968, (NATO Information Services, Brussels), Report on the Future
Tasks of the Alliance, 26. (Copy on file with the author.)
56
See Minutes of the Fifteenth Meeting of Washington Exploratory Talks on Security supra at note 39.
57
Interim Report by the Committee on the North Atlantic Community, NATO ARCHIVES, n. 1 (Nov. 26,
1951), http://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/1/9/19841/C_8-D_6_ENG.pdf
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applies if the security of one or more of the NATO countries is
threatened. 58

The 1956 Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation
in NATO envisioned “an Atlantic Community whose roots are deeper even than
the necessity for common defence.”59 It also identified Article 2 and Article 4 as
important for non-military cooperation.60 “These two Articles, limited in their
terms but with at least the promise of the grand design of an Atlantic Community,
were included because of this insistent feeling that NATO must become more
than a military alliance.”61 The NATO Information Service pamphlet, Aspects of
NATO: Political Consultation, published in 1969, returned to the more utilitarian
appreciation of Article 4 consultation by republishing the 1951 Council Report:
Special attention must be paid, as explicitly recognized in Article 4 of
the Treaty, to matters of urgent and immediate importance to the
members of NATO, and to “emergency” situations where it may be
necessary to consult closely on national lines of conduct affecting the
interest of the members of NATO as a whole.62

B. Request for Article 4 Consultations
The emergency situation foreseen by the drafters of the North Atlantic Treaty
and contemplated in 1969 arrived in February of 2003.63 As the United States
prepared for conflict with Iraq, Turkey requested Article 4 consultation.64
Through a process of consensus and after shifting the consultation from the
North Atlantic Council to the Defence Planning Committee, NATO was able to
provide Turkey with the defensive support it requested.65 Since then, four
extraordinary meetings of the North Atlantic Council have occurred at the
request of NATO nations for Article 4 consultations. Three of these meetings
have been in support of Turkey.66 In 2014, Poland called for Article 4
58

HASTINGS LIONEL ISMAY, NATO-THE FIRST 5 YEARS 1949–1954,14 (1954).
Report of the Committee of Three, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Dec. 13, 1956), https://www.nato.
int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17481.htm.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
NATO INFORMATION DIVISION, ASPECTS OF NATO: POLITICAL CONSULTATION, 18 (1969).
63
See generally NATO and the 2003 Campaign Against Iraq, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG.,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_51977.htm .
64
Id.
65
Aaron D. Lindstrom, Consensus Decision-making in NATO: French Unilateralism and the Decision to
Defend Turkey, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 579 (2003).
66
See generally NATO support to Turkey: Background and Timeline, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG.
(Feb. 19, 2013), https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/topics_92555.htm.
59
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consultation after Russia’s aggression and military intervention into Ukraine.67
Following this consultation, NATO suspended civilian and military cooperation
with Russia.68
C. NATO’s Strategic Concept
The Strategic Concept of NATO is a means to operationalize the global
perspective contained in Article 4 to protect the North Atlantic Alliance from
threats that may arise anywhere in the world.69 In addition to the emergency
consultation role Article 4 plays within the framework of the North Atlantic
Treaty, Article 4 has been featured as a core capability of the Alliance in each of
NATO’s three Strategic Concepts70 since 1991. The 1991 Strategic Concept
identified as a primary task of the Alliance, “To serve, as provided for in Article
4 of the Washington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied
consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including
developments posing risks for members’ security, and for appropriate
coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.”71 The 1991 Security
Concept also declared undertakings by NATO such as conflict prevention and
crisis management through non-Article 5 crisis response operations.72 The 1999
Strategic Concept retained the Article 4 task of Allied consultation while also
considering risks “of a wider nature including acts of terrorism, sabotage and
organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources.”73 Mass

67
Statement by the North Atlantic Council Following Meeting Ander Article 4 of the Washington Treaty,
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Mar. 4, 2014), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_107716.htm.
68
Relations with Russia, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm.
69
DIIS REPORT 2011:02: NATO’S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT: A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT, 8 (2011),
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/59845/1/656748095.pdf.
70
Strategic Concepts, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_56626.htm. (“The Strategic Concept is an official document that outlines NATO’s enduring purpose and
nature, and its fundamental security tasks. It also identifies the central features of the new security environment,
specifies the elements of the Alliance’s approach to security and provides guidelines for the adaptation of its
military forces.”).
71
The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Nov. 8, 1991), https://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm.
72
See id.
73
The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Apr. 10, 1999), https://www.nato.
int/cps/su/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm?selectedLocale=en.
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migration caused by conflict may affect Alliance stability and security and
necessitate Article 4 consultation.74
New functions for Article 4 continue in the 2010 Strategic Concept which,
in 2019, remains in effect.75 Article 4 consultation now permits, “Any security
issue of interest to any Ally can be brought to the NATO table, to share
information, exchange views and, where appropriate, forge common
approaches.”76 What these different uses of Article 4 in three Strategic Concepts
show is that, as a matter of practice, Article 4 continues to evolve.
CONCLUSION
Summing up the legal value of Article 4 to the North Atlantic Treaty and the
functioning of the North Atlantic Alliance requires taking stock of the great
changes in the security landscape of the world during the past seventy years. The
concept of multinational consultation was first envisioned as a coordination
mechanism to deter “internal fifth-column aggression supported by the threat of
external force, on the Czech model”77 used by the Soviet Union to consolidate
its hold over Eastern Europe. In the first draft of the text that became Article 4,
emphasis was placed on the twin threat of armed attack or indirect aggression.78
Yet as the number of nations willing to work together to protect the North
Atlantic area increased from three to six to seven to eight and the lengthy
negotiation of the Treaty continued, the importance of consultation to achieve
consensus became more apparent.79
When the North Atlantic Council came into being the only two mandatory
meetings were if a call for Article 4 consultation was requested or an Article 5
response to an armed attack was required.80 Thankfully neither of these meetings
occurred in the 20th Century. Looking forward in 2019, despite the tragedy of
the 9/11 attacks and the more recent need for Article 4 consultations, the NATO
nations remain willing to continue to work together in a culture of consultation.
Measured by this standard, the historic and still evolving significance of Article

74

See generally id.
See generally Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of
the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, supra note 5.
76
Id. at 9.
77
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State,
Document 31, 840.20/3-848 (Mar. 8, 1948), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v03/d31.
78
Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the United States—United Kingdom—Canada Security Conversations,
supra note 3.
79
REID, supra note 8.
80
Kalijarvi & Wilcox, supra note 56.
75
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4 has certainly contributed to the success of the North Atlantic Alliance, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the ability of both to respond to a
changing security environment.

